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3.1    Introduction
At the end of 2001, an estimated 5.6 million U.S. adults had served time in 
state or federal prison, including 4.3 million former prisoners and 1.3 million 
adults in prison. Each year, more than half a million state and federal prison-
ers are released from correctional institutions and may attempt to reenter 
the civilian labor force (Harrison and Beck 2006). As these ex- oﬀenders seek 
employment, they face employers averse to hiring applicants with criminal 
records. Until recently, it has been diﬃcult for hiring oﬃcials to verify an 
applicant’s criminal history. Since 1997, states have begun to make criminal 
history records publicly available over the Internet, which has lowered the 
cost and increased the scope of the criminal background checks that can be 
conducted in those states. This chapter exploits this previously unexamined 
variation to measure the eﬀect of expanded access to criminal history data 
on the labor market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders. Since an 
employer’s decision to conduct criminal background checks is likely a func-
tion of his or her applicant pool, using policy variation in record openness 
should provide estimates closer to the direct eﬀect of greater information 
available to employers during hiring.
Employers are apprehensive to hire ex-  oﬀenders, so opening criminal 
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history records is expected to worsen their labor market opportunities. But 
economic theory predicts eﬀects for non-  oﬀenders as well. Employers have 
imperfect information about the criminal records of applicants, so rational 
employers may use observable correlates of criminality as proxies for crimi-
nality and statistically discriminate against groups with high rates of crimi-
nal activity or incarceration. In the absence of open records, non-  oﬀenders 
from groups with high incarceration rates would be adversely aﬀected. When 
accurate criminal history records become easier to obtain, the labor market 
outcomes of these non-  oﬀenders should improve, as employers can deter-
mine with greater certainty whether applicants have criminal records.
This chapter tests these hypotheses, using detailed criminal and labor mar-
ket histories from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY97). The criminal history variables in this survey allow me to 
distinguish ex- oﬀenders from non- oﬀenders. I also use the criminal histories 
to model employer perceptions of criminality, assuming that they are based 
on rational expectations of incarceration probabilities. I ﬁ  nd evidence that 
labor market outcomes are worse for ex- oﬀenders once state criminal history 
records become available over the Internet, which demonstrates that employ-
ers have imperfect information about criminal histories. Non- oﬀenders from 
highly oﬀending groups do not appear, however, to have signiﬁ  cantly better 
labor market outcomes. The sign of the non-  oﬀenders estimates are con-
sistent with the predictions of the statistical discrimination model, but the 
estimates are not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero. It is important to note that 
these estimates may be confounded by a short sample period and ongoing 
human capital investments.
This study makes two important contributions to the empirical literature 
on the labor market eﬀects of employer use of preemployment screening 
technologies: it exploits an exogenous change in the employer’s information 
set to identify the eﬀect of that information and it uses observed criminal 
history data to distinguish eﬀects for less desirable applicants (oﬀenders) 
from more desirable applicants (non- oﬀenders). The research design makes 
use of technological changes in the amount of criminal history data avail-
able to employers. This strategy contrasts with research that uses variation 
in employer decisions to conduct criminal background checks, since these 
decisions are likely endogenous to the composition of applicant pools. 
For example, Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2006) use establishment data on 
employer use of criminal background checks and preferences toward hiring 
ex- oﬀenders. They ﬁ  nd evidence that employers who are averse to hiring ex- 
oﬀenders are relatively more likely to hire black men if they conduct criminal 
background checks. Since black men are more likely to be incarcerated than 
white men, they argue that this is evidence of statistical discrimination in 
the absence of background checks. The authors control for some observ-
able characteristics of the applicant pool, but the employers that choose to 
use criminal background checks do so because of the potential of hiring an Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    9 1
ex- oﬀender, which generally is a quality unobservable to researchers using 
ﬁ  rm-  level data. In order to get estimates that are closer to the causal eﬀect 
of criminal background checks, my analysis identiﬁ  es the eﬀect of employer 
access to criminal records using variation that is unrelated to the propor-
tion of ex-  oﬀenders in the aﬀected labor markets or the hiring preferences 
of employers.
The research design used in this chapter is similar to one used by Autor 
and Scarborough (2008) to study the diﬀusion of preemployment personal-
ity tests at a national retail chain. They ﬁ  nd that the relative hiring of blacks 
did not fall after the introduction of the tests, despite the fact that blacks 
in general perform worse on the tests, and they suggest that managers were 
eﬀectively statistically discriminating before the tests. Both that paper and 
this chapter use technological changes in the employer’s information set to 
study how more information aﬀects groups who do poorly on the preem-
ployment screen (e.g., personality tests or criminal background checks). This 
chapter also builds on this approach by exploiting longitudinal criminal his-
tory data to distinguish ex- oﬀenders from non- oﬀenders (or more generally, 
undesirable from desirable applicants). Using this information, I explicitly 
model employer perceptions of the criminality of potential employees using 
characteristics observable to both the employer and the researcher. These 
data allow me to estimate separate eﬀects of expanded access to criminal 
histories for ex- oﬀenders and non- oﬀenders, which allows for a unique test 
for statistical discrimination.
In addition to providing an empirical test of statistical discrimination, 
the results of this chapter are important for understanding the transition 
of ex-  oﬀenders back into the legitimate labor force. As the ﬂ  ow of released 
prisoners increases over the next ten years, the issue of reentry into the 
legitimate labor market will force policymakers to consider the unintended 
consequences of open criminal history records. Legitimate employment is a 
strong predictor of criminal desistence (Sampson and Laub 1993; Needels 
1996; Uggen 2000), so expanded use of criminal background checks has the 
potential to increase recidivism and the long-  term ﬁ  scal costs of criminal 
punishment. But there may also be some beneﬁ  ciaries from open records. 
All else equal, individuals who do not have criminal records but come from 
highly oﬀending groups stand to beneﬁ  t from a more transparent criminal 
records system.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I outline recent changes in the 
availability of criminal background data and how I use these changes for this 
study. Then, I consider how more open criminal history records may aﬀect 
ex- oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders, review the literature related to the labor 
market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders, and review some literature on the labor 
market eﬀects of preemployment screening. Next, I describe the individual-
  level data. Then, I discuss the empirical strategy, regression results, and 
conclusions.92    Keith  Finlay
3.2      Expanded Availability of Criminal History Data
A criminal history record positively identiﬁ  es an individual and describes 
that person’s arrests and subsequent dispositions relating to a criminal event. 
Until recently, they have been used primarily for law enforcement purposes. 
Criminal history records have been legally available to the public since the 
1976 case Paul v. Davis, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the publica-
tion of oﬃcial acts, including arrest, conviction, and incarceration records, 
were not protected by privacy rights.1 Widespread use of criminal back-
ground checks as a preemployment screen is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that stems from expanded legal availability and technical improvements that 
have made records more accessible.
Employer demand for criminal background checks is driven by their aver-
sion to hiring applicants with criminal records. Criminal oﬀenders may have 
fewer skills or be more likely to commit crime at the workplace, which can 
expose employers to negligent- hiring lawsuits.2 In a 2001 survey of employ-
ers, more than 60 percent would “probably not” or “deﬁ  nitely not” hire an 
ex- oﬀender (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2006). The U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (1987a, 1987b) has declared that employers may 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if they broadly deny employ-
ment to applicants with criminal records, but that employers can ban appli-
cants who have committed particular oﬀenses if employers demonstrate 
these oﬀenses are directly related to job functions. Some states have more 
severe restrictions, but there is little evidence of active enforcement.
Given the risks of hiring ex-  oﬀenders and the relatively low cost of con-
ducting criminal background checks, human resource practitioners now rec-
ommend conducting checks on all hires (Andler and Herbst 2003; Rosen 
2006). Evidence from employer surveys shows a large increase in the last 
two decades in the use of criminal background checks during the hiring 
process. Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2007) report responses from surveys 
of Los Angeles employers in 1992 to 1994 and 2001. In the 1992 to 1994 
sample, 32 percent of employers reported that they always conducted crimi-
nal background checks. In the 2001 sample, 46 percent said they always 
conducted criminal background checks. In 2004, the Society for Human 
Resource Management surveyed its members about preemployment screen-
1. Paul v. Davis, 424 US 693 (1976).
2. Negligent hiring can occur when an employee causes injury to a customer or coworker and 
the employer failed to take reasonable action in hiring that could have prevented the injury. A 
2004 survey of human resource managers found that 3 percent of their ﬁ  rms had been accused 
of negligent hiring in the three years before the survey (Burke 2005). Although the incidence 
of negligent hiring suits can be small, the potential monetary costs can be substantial. Wider 
availability of criminal background checks may be an important cause of increased attention 
to negligent hiring, since it lowers the cost of “reasonable” due diligence. See Odewahn and 
Webb (1989), Johnson and Indvik (1994), and Connerley, Arvey, and Bernardy (2001) for a 
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ing practices. In this national sample, 68 percent responded that they always 
conduct criminal background checks. These samples are not directly com-
parable, but they suggest that employer use of criminal background checks 
has increased substantially over time.
Employers who conduct criminal background checks must decide who to 
have conduct the search and over what jurisdictions to search.3 Private pro-
viders of background checks are plentiful, but the accuracy of their searches 
is not guaranteed to be any better than if an employer conducts the check on 
his or her own (Bushway et al. 2007). In reality, employers have no access to 
a national criminal background check. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
maintains the only national repository of criminal records, known as the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC), but it is not accessible by the 
general public. In lieu of a national search, most employers settle for a local-
ized search of criminal records, which have historically been conducted by 
couriers at local courthouses. Employers seeking a wider search of criminal 
history data can use state databases that aggregate local and state arrest, 
conviction, and incarceration records.
Until the mid-  1990s, there were few state-  level resources for criminal 
background checks, but state-  level databases are increasingly the most 
comprehensive sources of criminal history data.4 Automation of records 
by the states was facilitated by the National Criminal History Improvement 
Program, which was mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act of 1993.5 The Act imposed a ﬁ  ve-  day waiting period for ﬁ  rearm pur-
chases and required that prospective gun owners clear background checks 
during that waiting period. The Act also stipulated that within ﬁ  ve years of 
its eﬀective date such checks should be performed instantaneously through a 
national criminal background check system maintained by the Department 
of Justice (which became the FBI’s NCIC system), and allocated funds for 
states to automate their records. Since 1995, states have received approxi-
mately $400 million to improve data quality and speed the time between 
a criminal history event and when it is entered into a state-  level database 
(Brien 2005). As a result of the Brady Act, states began to have the techni-
cal capability to make criminal history records more accessible. In the late 
1990s, some states began to make these records available over the Internet. 
Internet-  based criminal background checks are signiﬁ  cantly more con-
venient than any other method and state-  level aggregation increases the 
geographic scope of background checks, so provision of criminal history 
3. See Rosen (2006) and Hinton (2004) for thorough discussions of criminal background 
check sources and reliability.
4. From 1993 to 2001, the number of individuals in state criminal record databases increased 
from 47 million to 64 million (SEARCH 1994, Brien 2005). Over the same period, the pro-
portion of all criminal history records that were automated increased from 79 to 89 percent 
(SEARCH 1994; Brien 2005).
5. Public Law 103-  159, Title I, 30 November 1993, 107 Statute 1536.94    Keith  Finlay
records over the Internet is one of the most signiﬁ  cant changes in the acces-
sibility of records since the Supreme Court declared them public records in 
1976. For these reasons, I use the provision of records over the Internet as 
the policy variation to identify the eﬀect of record openness on labor market 
outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders.
A state is classiﬁ  ed as having open records if, in a given year, it provides 
online access to the criminal histories of individuals released from its pris-
ons. I collected this panel of policy data directly from state departments of 
correction or state police agencies, starting with a cross section of policies 
reported by the Legal Action Center (2004). Oﬃcials were asked when their 
state ﬁ  rst provided criminal history records of released prisoners over the 
Internet. These websites allow any member of the public to search for ex- 
oﬀenders who served their time in that state’s prison system. In general, 
this will not be all prisoners, but rather prisoners who were sentenced to 
a year or more of prison time in local or state (but not in federal) courts. 
Although this is a subset of all prisoners, it is the majority of the incarcer-
ated population. The sites provide personal information—such as name and 
aliases, birthdate, physical characteristics, and race—that allow a searcher 
to positively identify an ex-  oﬀender. The searches also detail the oﬀenses 
for which time was served, lengths of the sentences, and release dates for 
each oﬀense. Some systems only identify current oﬀenders, but this informa-
tion is not useful to employers, so these states are not coded as having open 
records.
Figure 3.1 is a map of the United States showing the states that provide 
access to criminal records over the Internet, and the ﬁ  rst year that informa-
tion was available online. Between 1997 and 2004, sixteen states began to 
make their criminal records available over the Internet.6 The map shows 
that the expansion of access to criminal history records at the state level 
has been geographically and temporarily dispersed—an important feature 
of my identiﬁ  cation strategy. To account for time-  invariant unobservable 
diﬀerences across states that adopt open records versus states that do not 
adopt open records, all empirical models include state ﬁ  xed eﬀects. All mod-
els include year ﬁ  xed eﬀects to account for the overall relative employment 
trends of ex-  oﬀenders. Then, the eﬀects of opening criminal records are 
identiﬁ  ed if there are no contemporaneous trends in labor market outcomes 
for ex-  oﬀenders relative to non-  oﬀenders in states that open records versus 
states that do not. If these conditions hold, this research design will yield 
estimates of the causal eﬀects of greater information for employers about 
the criminal histories of their applicants.
6. Florida was the ﬁ  rst state to open records in this way in 1997. It was followed by New 
York and Washington in 1998; Michigan and South Carolina in 1999; Georgia, Indiana, New 
Mexico, and Wisconsin in 2000; Kansas, Nebraska, and North Carolina in 2001; Montana and 
Oklahoma in 2002; and Vermont in 2003.Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    9 5
One threat to identiﬁ  cation of a causal eﬀect is if states choose to make 
records available online based on legislative decisions related to employer 
preferences toward hiring ex-  oﬀenders. Fortunately, state adoption of 
Internet-  based records searches was primarily a function of administrative 
decisions and the removal of technological hurdles. Of the sixteen states 
distributing criminal history records to the public in my sample, eight states 
responded to a survey by SEARCH (2006) of their governments’ criminal 
records practices.7 Of these, seven states were providing records over the 
Internet because of an administrative decision that relied on some preexist-
ing statute. Only one state (Oklahoma) was opening records by a direct order 
of legislation. This evidence suggests that the timing of record openness was 
not primarily a result of speciﬁ  c legislation. In another survey by SEARCH 
(2001), state oﬃcials responsible for criminal history records emphasized 
the importance of technical issues in determining when records went online. 
The statements of these oﬃcials support the argument that the limiting 
factor in the public provision of criminal history data over the Internet was 
Fig. 3.1    States that distribute criminal history records over the Internet (and the 
ﬁ  rst year they did so)
Source: Data collected by author, starting from a cross section available in Legal Action Cen-
ter (2004).
Notes: States are shaded if they distribute the criminal history records of released prisoners 
over a publicly accessible Internet site.
7. SEARCH, the National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, has conducted 
surveys of criminal records systems on behalf of the Bureau of Justice Statistics.96    Keith  Finlay
technology rather than political preferences.8 Therefore, the temporal varia-
tion in introduction of open records, combined with state and year ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects, should allow for the identiﬁ  cation of the causal eﬀect of expanded 
access to criminal records on the labor market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders 
and non-  oﬀenders.
3.3      Literature Review and Hypotheses
3.3.1    Labor  Market  Eﬀects of Incarceration
This chapter addresses the eﬀects of changes in the availability of criminal 
history records. Since employers use these records to identify ex- oﬀenders, it 
would be useful to ﬁ  rst discuss the literature that examines the labor market 
eﬀects of incarceration. Determining the eﬀect of conviction or incarcera-
tion on employment and wages is nontrivial, since criminal oﬀenders may 
have unobservable qualities that aﬀect both their labor market outcomes 
and their propensities to commit crime. Researchers have employed a variety 
of methods to identify unbiased estimates of the eﬀect of incarceration on 
employment and wages. Grogger (1995) compares the labor market out-
comes of oﬀenders before and after periods of incarceration. Kling (2006) 
uses variation in judge sentencing to instrument for individual sentence 
length. Another strategy is to use more homogeneous samples, such as 
those that will ever be convicted or incarcerated, an approach used by Grog-
ger (1995), Western (2002), and Kling (2006). This literature tends to ﬁ  nd 
small, negative, statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀects of incarceration on wages and 
employment without sample restrictions. Once less heterogeneous samples 
or ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects strategies are used, estimates attenuate and commonly 
become insigniﬁ  cant.9 Following this literature, some of the speciﬁ  cations 
in this chapter use individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects to account for unobservable het-
8. For example, Dave Sim of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation alludes to a learning process 
in administrative agencies with respect to providing criminal history data over the Internet:
Kansas maintains a prototype system that provides select non- criminal justice entities with 
Internet access to criminal history record information. The State will expand access to all 
users when it migrates from the prototype to its ﬁ  nal design later in 2001. The system was 
designed primarily for criminal justice agencies but Kansas provided limited non-  criminal 
justice access as it gained experience with Internet operations. (SEARCH 2001)
In the same survey, Ruth Lunn of the Maine State Police reported that Maine had not even 
begun the automation process necessary to provide records over the Internet (SEARCH 2001). 
Her responses do not mention statute as the limiting factor in providing records, but rather the 
technological issues. David Dishong of the Nebraska State Patrol also suggested that the timing 
of public access to records over the Internet was a function of “programming and procedural 
issues” (SEARCH 2001).
9. Almost all prisoners are male, so most studies of the labor market eﬀects of incarceration 
use only samples of men. But in a recent study of women incarcerated in Illinois, Cho and 
LaLonde (2008) ﬁ  nd some positive eﬀects of incarceration on earnings.Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    9 7
erogeneity. My research also complements this literature by exploring how 
employers learn about the criminal records of potential employees.
3.3.2    Labor  Market  Eﬀects of Criminal Background Checks
Since employers have a strong aversion to hiring ex-  oﬀenders and since 
criminal history records have recently become more accessible, it is not sur-
prising that the use of criminal background checks has increased at the 
same time the number of ex-  oﬀenders has increased. Given the large racial 
diﬀerential in incarceration rates, the small literature on the labor market 
eﬀects of criminal background checks has focused on how greater use of or 
access to criminal records aﬀects the relative hiring or employment rates of 
black men. While the theory of statistical discrimination predicts that open 
records will worsen the outcomes of black ex- oﬀenders and improve the out-
comes of black non-  oﬀenders, the theory is ambiguous about the net eﬀect 
for blacks relative to whites. None of the existing studies of criminal history 
records rely on data that distinguishes ex-  oﬀenders from non-  oﬀenders, so 
the authors focus on the net eﬀect for blacks relative to whites.
Holzer, Raphael, and Stall (2006) use establishment data on employer use 
of criminal background checks and preferences toward hiring ex- oﬀenders. 
They argue that ﬁ  rms that prefer not to hire ex- oﬀenders will be more likely 
to hire black applicants if they also conduct background checks. Employers 
who state an aversion to hiring ex- oﬀenders are more sensitive to asymmet-
ric information with respect to the criminal records of job candidates. There-
fore, these employers have a stronger incentive to statistically discriminate, 
and so the relative hiring of blacks should be more positively aﬀected once 
these ﬁ  rms conduct criminal background checks. The authors ﬁ  nd evidence 
that supports this hypothesis and indicates that employers do statistically 
discriminate. But employers who conduct criminal background checks may 
also have applicant pools with a higher proportion of applicants who are 
black or have criminal records. Some of the estimated parameters of inter-
est are not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero once the authors control for 
the composition of each ﬁ  rm’s applicant pool. Nonetheless, the study is an 
important look at the eﬀects of criminal background checks and the results 
provide some evidence that opening records may lead to net beneﬁ  ts for 
individuals from highly oﬀending groups.
In the ﬁ  rst attempt to examine the availability of records across states, 
Bushway (1996) ﬁ  nds that the weekly earnings of young black men with 
a high school degree were higher in states that had more of their criminal 
history records automated—a measure he argues can serve as a proxy for 
record accessibility. In other work, Bushway (2004) uses a composite record 
openness score generated by the Legal Action Center (2004). He ﬁ  nds that 
the ratio of black to white wages was higher and the ratio of black to white 
employment probabilities was lower in states that had higher openness 
scores, although neither estimate is signiﬁ  cant. The estimated eﬀect on wages 98    Keith  Finlay
is consistent with large drops in employment if it is primarily low-  skilled 
black men that are dropping out of the labor market. While Bushway is the 
ﬁ  rst to use state variation to measure the labor market eﬀects of criminal 
background checks, his work is cross-  sectional, so it does not control for 
unobserved diﬀerences in labor markets across states particular to black men 
that are correlated with criminal records automation or accessibility. My 
research design builds on Bushway’s work by using a panel of state policies 
regarding criminal history records, which should better isolate the direct 
eﬀect of employer access to records on labor market outcomes.
In a very diﬀerent research design, Pager (2003) conducted an audit study 
of the eﬀect of criminal records. In the study, four male, college-  educated 
auditors each applied to low-  skill job listings in Milwaukee. One pair was 
black, one pair was white, and one of each pair identiﬁ  ed himself as having 
a criminal record. The callback rate for ex-  oﬀenders was less than half of 
the callback rate for non-  oﬀenders. Pager also ﬁ  nds that the callback rate 
for the black, ex- oﬀender applicants was lower than the callback rate for the 
white, ex-  oﬀender applicants, controlling for a lower overall callback rate 
for all black applicants, although the interaction estimate is not signiﬁ  cantly 
diﬀerent from zero. Pager’s results suggest that the labor market eﬀects of 
incarceration are tied to the eﬀects of race in the labor market. The results 
also highlight the diﬃculty that ex-  oﬀenders have in gaining employment 
after release.
While these studies have examined the net eﬀect of access to criminal his-
tories on blacks relative to whites, economic theory predicts more nuanced 
eﬀects for non-  oﬀenders and ex-  oﬀenders that may result from statistical 
discrimination by employers. If employers are averse to hiring ex- oﬀenders, 
then they have an incentive to use observable correlates of criminality or 
incarceration as proxies for those qualities. Using these proxies, employers 
can classify individuals as coming from groups with low rates of incarcera-
tion (or low perceived criminality) or high rates of incarceration (high per-
ceived criminality). In the absence of open records, one would observe an 
averaging of the labor market outcomes for individuals within either group. 
For example, black men who are high school dropouts have very high incar-
ceration rates. If employers statistically discriminate, then the outcomes for 
black non-  oﬀenders that have not completed high school will be relatively 
worse than they would have been without statistical discrimination, but ex- 
oﬀenders from that group will have relatively better outcomes. Similarly, 
white ex-  oﬀenders should beneﬁ  t from statistical discrimination because 
they come from a group with relatively low rates of incarceration.
Now suppose that criminal history records become publicly available. If 
employers can directly observe criminal history records, they no longer need 
to rely on statistical discrimination. This will cause a separation in the labor 
market outcomes of ex- oﬀenders and non- oﬀenders within highly oﬀending 
groups. Speciﬁ  cally, ex-  oﬀenders should do worse and non- oﬀenders should Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    9 9
have improved labor market outcomes. Figure 3.2 illustrates the main fea-
tures of the model. Each panel shows a plot of labor market outcomes 
(hiring odds or wages) against an index of perceived criminality. Perceived 
criminality is an index created by the employer using observable proxy vari-
ables as a substitute for observed criminality. Panel A shows the hiring policy 
when criminal records are not available to employers. The dotted line shows 
that labor market outcomes are decreasing in perceived criminality. Panel B 
shows the hiring policy when criminal records are available to employers. In 
this case, there would be a bifurcation from the hiring policy under closed 
records. Now that employers can distinguish oﬀenders from non- oﬀenders, 
the labor market outcomes of non-  oﬀenders with high perceived criminal-
Fig. 3.2    Statistical discrimination model with criminal history records: A, Crimi-
nal records not publicly available; B, Criminal records available
A
B100    Keith  Finlay
ity improve. Also note that oﬀenders with low perceived criminality suﬀer a 
greater decline in labor market outcomes relative to other oﬀenders.
A simple empirical model can capture the main characteristics of the 
model shown in ﬁ  gure 3.2. For a relevant labor market outcome Y, one could 
estimate the following regression:
(1)   Y    0    1PC    2Access   Inc    3PC   Access 
     4PC   Access   Inc    5PC   Inc    6Access    7Inc   ε,
where Access indicates if employers have access to criminal history records, 
Inc is a dummy for an individual’s own criminal record, PC is the employer’s 
perception of the individual’s criminality, and ε is an error term. Note that 
this model could apply generally to any situation in which some employers 
have technical access to the criminal history data of their applicants and 
some do not (and this accessibility is not a function of an employer’s deci-
sion). For the moment, I will abstract away from a more complete model 
that includes the individual controls and ﬁ  xed eﬀects required to identify 
the eﬀects of open records in my institutional context.
This model can be used to test the two primary hypotheses generated by 
the model of statistical discrimination. First, the model predicts that the 
main eﬀect of true criminality should become more negative when employers 
can access criminal history records. This eﬀect is captured by the coeﬃcient 
on the interaction of Inc and Access, so it can be tested with the alternative 
hypothesis  2   0 and null hypothesis  2   0. Second, the model predicts 
that non-  oﬀenders with high perceived criminality should have improved 
labor market outcomes if potential employers can verify that they are non-
 o ﬀenders (i.e., when criminal history records are publicly available). This 
hypothesis mirrors one in which ex-  oﬀenders with high perceived criminal-
ity have relatively worse outcomes from similar non-  oﬀenders once records 
are open. This can be tested with the alternative hypothesis  3   0 and null 
hypothesis  3   0. Note that both of these hypotheses test relative and not 
absolute eﬀects of employer access to criminal history data.
This statistical discrimination framework will guide the empirical approach 
that follows. First, I discuss the individual data on criminal and labor market 
histories that will be used to estimate the model suggested earlier.
3.4    Data
This chapter uses the criminal and labor market histories from the 1997 
cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The 
NLSY97 includes a nationally representative sample of all youths aged 
twelve to sixteen years by the end of 1996, and an oversample of black and 
Hispanic youths meeting the same age restriction. Currently, the NLSY97 
has released eight rounds of data, covering interviews from 1997 through Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    1 0 1
2004. The NLSY97 is an excellent sample for this project because it has 
information about both the criminal activity of respondents and their labor 
market outcomes. This is a rare quality for a nationally representative survey, 
and the NLSY97 is especially useful because the sample period coincides 
with the introduction of Internet sites for accessing criminal history records. 
The criminal records policies discussed previously are matched with indi-
vidual respondents using the state geocodes available in the private-  release 
version of the NLSY97. There are a few drawbacks of using the NLSY97 
for this research. This is a very young sample, when the ﬁ  rst states make 
their records available online. While young people are the most likely to 
be incarcerated, many of the survey respondents are still completing their 
schooling at or near the end of the sample period. This limits the extent to 
which the labor market outcomes of NLSY97 respondents can reasonably 
be aﬀected by changes in criminal records openness. Table 3.1 shows the 
number of NLSY97 respondents aged more than eighteen years, by age and 
survey year. It shows the small range of adult ages available in Round 8 of 
the NLSY97, the most recent survey year. The oldest survey participants 
have aged twenty- ﬁ  ve years, but few individuals have reached this age in the 
sample period.
The sample I use in regression analysis consists of men and women aged at 
least eighteen years, covering survey years 1997 to 2004. Because of the par-
ticular importance of clearly identifying race and ethnicity for this analysis, 
the sample is further restricted to respondents who are either non- Hispanic 
white, non- Hispanic black, or Hispanic. I use both the representative sample 
and the minority oversample with sampling weights.10 Table 3.2 shows how 
the sample restrictions aﬀect the number of individuals and panel obser-
vations. Up to Round 8, the NLSY97 is composed of 64,336 completed 
interviews from 8,984 survey participants. With the age, race, and ethnicity 
Table 3.1  Number of NLSY97 respondents aged eighteen years or older, by age 
and survey year, 1997–2004
Ages  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Total
18 21 1,407 1,618 1,648 1,597 1,613 113 0 7,996
19 0 109 1,380 1,595 1,587 1,583 1,497 52 7,803
20 0 0 67 1,381 1,560 1,638 1,597 1,444 7,687
21 0 0 0 133 1,318 1,576 1,583 1,508 6,118
22 0 0 0 0 108 1,322 1,559 1,551 4,540
2 3 0 0000 1 1 1 1,291 1,524 2,926
2 4 0 00000 7 9 1,288 1,367
2 5 0 000000 9 79 7
Total  21   1,516   3,065   4,757   6,170   7,843   7,719   7,464   38,555
10. Custom sampling weights for NLSY97 respondents in any survey year come from 
http:/ / www.nlsinfo.org/ web- investigator/ custom_weights.php.102    Keith  Finlay
restrictions, the analytic sample is reduced to 37,114 observations on 8,332 
respondents.11 In regressions of labor market outcomes, I also exclude indi-
viduals who are incarcerated at the time of their interviews since those incar-
cerations might mechanically determine employment and earnings in a way 
that is unrelated to employer decisions. This restriction leaves 36,687 obser-
vations from 8,304 individuals. In regressions that exploit within- individual 
variation in labor market outcomes, identiﬁ  cation eﬀectively comes from the 
7,945 individuals who have at least two interviews (36,328 observations).
I use three labor market outcomes as dependent variables: employment 
status, the natural logarithm of hourly wage, and the natural logarithm of 
annual earnings. Employment status is equal to 1 if the respondent was 
employed at the date of the interview. Hourly wage is the maximum of the 
NLSY-  created hourly wage variables for each job held since the last inter-
view. The earnings variable is the total income from wages and salary in 
the calendar year before the interview.12 Employment status is observed for 
all respondents (36,687 observations), while there are only 30,145 positive 
observations for wages and only 27,137 positive observations for annual 
earnings.
The NLSY97 also has extensive information on interactions with the 
criminal justice system.13 Incarceration information comes from two types 
Table 3.2  NLSY97 sample restrictions
Iterative sample restrictions   Panel observations  Individuals
Completed interviews 64,336 8,984
–25,781 –325
Aged 18 or more years 38,555 8,659
–1,439 –325
White, black, or Hispanic 37,116 8,334
–2 –2
Nonzero sampling weights 37,114 8,332
–427 –28
Not incarcerated during interview 36,687 8,304
–359 –359
More than one interview (eﬀective variation 
for individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects models)
  36,328   7,945
Note: The last two sample restrictions apply only to the samples for the regressions of labor 
market outcomes.
11. In addition, two observations are dropped because they have sampling weights equal 
to zero.
12. Wages and earnings are inﬂ  ated to 2005 dollars using the All-  Urban series of the Con-
sumer Price Index.
13. The criminal history data in the NLSY97 is used by Lochner (2007) to study how young 
people update arrest probabilities and by Hjalmarsson (2008) to study the eﬀect of conviction 
and incarceration on high school completion. These papers focus on criminal justice interac-
tions as a minor, while this chapter focuses on adult interactions.Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    1 0 3
of questions. First, if the interview was conducted at a jail or the respondent 
classiﬁ  ed his or her dwelling as a correctional institution, this was noted. Sec-
ond, an iterative round of questions addressed any arrests and whether they 
led to conviction or incarceration. I created indicator variables for whether 
the respondent was incarcerated at the time of the interview or since the date 
of the last interview. Since this research is about criminal history records that 
are limited to adult oﬀenses, I also constructed incarceration indicators that 
are restricted to adult oﬀenses.14 Finally, a variable was created to indicate 
whether the respondent had ever been incarcerated as an adult by the date 
of the current interview.15
I also include a number of other variables as controls. To control for labor 
market experience, I use the years of accumulated labor market experience 
from age thirteen. Education controls include accumulated years of school 
attended since age thirteen and a set of dummies for highest degree received 
as of June 30 of the survey year (namely, whether the individual has a general 
equivalency diploma [GED], a high school diploma, an associate’s degree, 
or a bachelor’s or postgraduate degree). To account for macroeconomic 
conditions, the state-  level unemployment rate is also included as a control. 
In regressions without individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects, the Armed Services Voca-
tional Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test score and race, ethnicity, and gender 
indicators serve as controls.
3.4.1    Descriptive  Statistics
Table 3.3 shows selected descriptive statistics for labor market outcomes, 
incarceration, and other covariates from the last survey round in which 
NLSY97 respondents participated. The employment rate at the end of the 
sample is 72 percent. The average wage is $12.15 and the average annual 
earnings are about $10,400. Four percent of the sample has been incarcer-
ated as an adult. The average age in the last reported interview is almost 
twenty-  two years. Respondents report average work experience of about 
seven years, which includes work experience as a minor. Average completed 
schooling is almost thirteen years, although 30 percent of the sample is still 
enrolled in school at the end of the sample.
Table 3.3 also details how ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders diﬀer across 
observable characteristics. Ex-  oﬀenders are signiﬁ  cantly less likely than 
non- oﬀenders to be employed (59 percent versus 72 percent, respectively). 
Despite the employment diﬀerential, the hourly wages of ex-  oﬀenders are 
not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from the hourly wages of non- oﬀenders (although 
14. It is diﬃcult to determine in which state each respondent experienced his or her convic-
tion or incarceration, so I cannot make a clean determination if an individual’s records are 
deﬁ  nitely available to employers in his or her state of residence if he or she has moved across 
states. Luckily, there are relatively few interstate moves.
15. Studies of post-  incarceration employment have found no signiﬁ  cant eﬀect of longer 
sentences on labor market outcomes (Needels 1996; Kling 2006), so I focus on the binomial 
characterization of past incarceration.Table 3.3  Selected descriptive statistics of variables from the last survey round in which each 





as an adult  
Not incarcerated 
as an adult
Employment status 0.72 0.59 0.72
8,304 369 7,935
Hourly wage 12.15 11.85 12.16
(6.54) (5.80) (6.57)
6,744 290 6,454
Annual earnings 10,402.22 7,304.67 10,546.74
(12,010.67) (8,824.73) (12,120.02)
8,166 364 7,802
Ever incarcerated as an adult 0.04 1.00 0.00
8,304 369 7,935
Age 21.74 22.22 21.72
(1.57) (1.52) (1.57)
8,304 369 7,935
Highest grade completed 12.80 11.21 12.87
(1.90) (1.61) (1.88)
8,304 369 7,935
Currently enrolled in school 0.30 0.08 0.31
8,304 369 7,935
Has GED 0.06 0.19 0.05
8,304 369 7,935
Has HS diploma 0.67 0.32 0.69
8,304 369 7,935
Has associate’s 0.03 0.01 0.03
8,304 369 7,935
Has bachelor’s or more 0.08 0.04 0.08
8,304 369 7,935
Years of school attended since age 13 8.70 9.17 8.68
(1.55) (1.49) (1.55)
8,304 369 7,935
Years of labor market experience since age 13 6.78 6.81 6.78
(2.29) (2.74) (2.26)
8,304 369 7,935
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery score 45.05 27.61 45.79
(29.18) (24.52) (29.13)
6,642 270 6,372
Lives in state with criminal records Internet site 0.37 0.39 0.37
    8,304   369   7,935
Notes: Cells contain the mean, standard deviation (where applicable), and number of nonmissing obser-
vations for each variable within the given sample. The sample used to generate these descriptive statistics 
excludes individuals who are incarcerated at the time of their interviews. See table 3.2 for a complete 
description of the sample restrictions.Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    1 0 5
the mean is lower for ex- oﬀenders, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent 
from zero). This might be explained by the higher rate of school enroll-
ment of non-  oﬀenders (31 percent of non-  oﬀenders are enrolled, but only 
8 percent of ex-  oﬀenders are enrolled). Ex-  oﬀenders also have fewer years 
of completed schooling and less labor market experience. Finally, the table 
shows that the proportion of individuals who live in states that provide 
criminal history data over the Internet is qualitatively similar across oﬀender 
status. In the analytic sample, 39 percent of respondents who have been 
incarcerated live in such a state, while 37 percent of the other respondents 
live in open-  records states.
Table 3.4 shows the age proﬁ  les for adult incarceration rates of NLSY97 
respondents, broken down by gender, race, and ethnicity.16 The diﬀerences 
in incarceration probabilities across both gender and race are stark. Black 
males are about four times as likely as white males to be incarcerated at any 
particular age. Hispanic males are somewhat more likely to be incarcer-
ated than white males, but not to the same extent as blacks. For example, 
of males aged twenty-  two years, 8.2 percent of black respondents were 
incarcerated, while 3.0 percent of Hispanic males and 2.3 percent of white 
males were incarcerated. Males of any race are signiﬁ  cantly more likely to 
be incarcerated than their female counterparts. These incarceration rates are 
qualitatively similar for men of these ages from other data sources, although 
the rates are somewhat lower. Using data from the 2000 Census, Raphael 
Table 3.4  Percentage of NLSY97 respondents who report having been incarcerated as an adult 
since the date of their last interview, by age, gender, and race/ethnicity, 1997–2004
Respondent age
Subsample   18   19   20   21   22   23   24
White males 1.80 2.18 2.13 1.82 2.34 1.98 0.96
n   1,996 n   1,969 n   1,925 n   1,537 n   1,111 n   708 n   312
Black males 4.51 5.92 7.03 7.85 8.18 6.38 7.82
n   1,043 n   1,014 n   981 n   790 n   599 n   376 n   179
Hispanic males 2.25 2.57 2.75 4.40 2.94 3.11 1.37
n   844 n   818 n   800 n   659 n   476 n   322 n   146
White females 0.32 0.21 0.49 0.41 0.28 0.15 1.01
n   1,903 n   1,866 n   1,829 n   1,458 n   1,089 n   687 n   298
Black females 0.56 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.32 0.48 0.43
n   1,076 n   1,023 n   1,053 n   807 n   625 n   421 n   231
Hispanic females 0.12 0.74 0.37 0.77 0.42 0.65 0.00
    n   833   n   815   n   807   n   648   n   477   n   307  n   147
Notes: Each cell contains the proportion as a percentage of respondents who are incarcerated as an adult 
sometime in the given age and the sample size. Age twenty-  ﬁ  ve is excluded because of small sample 
sizes.
16. Age twenty-  ﬁ  ve is excluded because of small sample sizes.106    Keith  Finlay
(2006) reports that 11 percent of black men aged eighteen to twenty-  ﬁ  ve 
years and 2 percent of white men aged eighteen to twenty-  ﬁ  ve years were 
incarcerated. This suggests that incarceration is somewhat underreported 
in the NLSY97.17
Figure 3.3 and table 3.5 show the cumulative age proﬁ  les for adult-
  incarceration rates of NLSY97 respondents, broken down by gender, race, 
and ethnicity. The gender and racial patterns of the age-  speciﬁ  c incarcera-
tion probabilities are also seen in the cumulative rates. (Note that the cumu-
lative rates are not monotonic because of the age structure of the respon-
dents and survey non-  response and attrition.) By age twenty-  four, almost 
19 percent of black men have been incarcerated as an adult, while about 
8 percent of white men and about 12 percent of Hispanic men have been 
incarcerated as an adult. These cumulative rates are qualitatively consistent 
with published rates from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Bonczar and Beck 
1997; Bonczar 2003).
17. Survey respondents are known to underreport criminal activity, and these underreports 
tend to be larger for blacks (Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis 1981; Viscusi 1986; Abe 2001).
Fig. 3.3    Cumulative proportion of NLSY97 respondents who have been incarcer-
ated as an adult by age, gender, and race/  ethnicity, 1997–2004
Notes: Plot shows the cumulative proportion of each subsample that has been incarcerated as 
an adult by the appropriate age. Age twenty-  ﬁ  ve is excluded because of small sample sizes. 
Lines are not all monotonic because not all respondents reach twenty- four years of age by the 
end of the sample, some respondents miss interviews, and some respondents attrit.Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    1 0 7
3.5    Regression  Results
This section presents regression results of the labor market eﬀects of more 
open criminal history records. First, I focus on the eﬀects for ex-  oﬀenders. 
Then, I examine how more open criminal history records aﬀect the labor 
market outcomes of both ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders from highly 
oﬀending groups.
3.5.1      Access to Criminal History Data and the 
Employment Eﬀects of Incarceration
There are a number of reasons to believe that employer access to crimi-
nal history data may inﬂ  uence the labor market eﬀects of incarceration. 
First, employers in states that do not have open criminal records may have 
trouble distinguishing ex- oﬀenders from non- oﬀenders, so adoption of open 
records should adversely aﬀect the labor market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders 
relative to non-  oﬀenders. Second, if employers are risk averse, the negative 
labor market eﬀects of incarceration may last longer under an open criminal 
records policy. Moreover, even higher-  productivity ex-  oﬀenders may have 
longer lasting employment problems if employer risk aversion prevents them 
from being hired in the ﬁ  rst place. Finally, if employers also underestimate 
the degree of criminality among applicants, then greater employer access 
Table 3.5  Cumulative percentage of NLSY97 respondents who report having been incarcerated 
as an adult by interview date, by age, gender, and race/ethnicity, 1997–2004
Respondent age
Subsample   18   19   20   21   22   23   24
White males 1.80 3.35 4.47 5.20 6.93 9.32 8.33
n   1,996 n   1,969 n   1,925 n   1,537 n   1,111 n   708 n   312
Black males 4.51 7.89 10.60 13.54 17.03 16.76 18.99
n   1,043 n   1,014 n   981 n   790 n   599 n   376 n   179
Hispanic males 2.25 3.67 4.75 8.65 9.24 10.87 12.33
n   844 n   818 n   800 n   659 n   476 n   322 n   146
White females 0.32 0.48 0.98 1.17 1.38 1.75 2.01
n   1,903 n   1,866 n   1,829 n   1,458 n   1,089 n   687 n   298
Black females 0.56 0.78 1.23 0.74 1.28 2.14 2.60
n   1,076 n   1,023 n   1,053 n   807 n   625 n   421 n  231
Hispanic females 0.12 0.86 0.87 1.54 2.10 2.61 2.04
    n   833   n   815   n   807   n   648   n   477   n   307  n   147
Notes: Each cell contains the cumulative percentage of respondents who have been incarcerated as an 
adult by the given age and the sample size.
Age twenty- ﬁ  ve is excluded because of small sample sizes. Proportions are not all monotonically increas-
ing because not all respondents reach age twenty-  four by the end of the sample, some respondents miss 
interviews, and there is attrition.108    Keith  Finlay
to criminal history records may also harm oﬀenders, on average, without 
necessarily beneﬁ  ting non-  oﬀenders.
The eﬀect of wider availability of criminal history records on the labor 
market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders is estimated in the following regression:
(2)  Yist    0   Xist 1    2Incit    3Accessst    4AccessstIncit 
     s    t    ist,
where Y ist is a relevant labor market outcome of individual i living in state s 
in year t, Incit is equal to 1 if individual i has been incarcerated as an adult 
by year t, and Accessst is equal to 1 if state s has an Internet site in year t on 
which the public can search for the incarceration records of ex-  oﬀenders. 
State ﬁ  xed eﬀects  s account for any time- invariant diﬀerences across states 
that adopt open records and states that do not. Year eﬀects  s account for 
any secular changes in labor market outcomes. The vector of individual 
controls, X, is discussed previously, and   is the error term. In order to mean-
ingfully interpret the coeﬃcient on Access, each continuous covariate in 
this vector is centered by its mean from each regression’s respective sample. 
The parameter of interest  4 is the diﬀerence in the employment outcomes 
between ex-  oﬀenders in states with more open records versus ex-  oﬀenders 
in states with more closed records.
Table 3.6 shows the estimates from equation (2) for each labor market 
outcome, using two identiﬁ  cation strategies. In the odd- numbered columns, 
the parameters are identiﬁ  ed oﬀ of the state and time variation in the intro-
duction of the provision of criminal history records over the Internet. These 
speciﬁ  cations treat the data as repeated cross sections and use state and year 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects for identiﬁ  cation. In the even-  numbered columns, the param-
eters are identiﬁ  ed oﬀ of changes in both oﬀender status and perceived 
criminality, in addition to the temporal and spatial variation in the introduc-
tion of open records. These speciﬁ  cations exploit the panel structure of the 
NLSY97 and include individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects and year eﬀects, but exclude 
the state eﬀects and time-  invariant controls.18
Employment status is the dependent variable in columns (1) and (2). In 
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. And 
in columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is annual earnings. For each 
identiﬁ  cation strategy, the table shows results with and without the open 
records variables included. I ﬁ  rst replicate the basic results of how incarcera-
tion aﬀects labor market outcomes. While a number of papers have consid-
ered these eﬀects using other data, I know of no other papers that estimate 
labor market eﬀects of incarceration using the more recent NLSY97. By ﬁ  rst 
estimating the incarceration eﬀects with this new data, we can interpret the 
estimated eﬀects of background checks in the context of previous estimates 
18. Given the small number of interstate moves, state ﬁ  xed eﬀects are not included in speci-
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of incarceration eﬀects. This exercise will also verify the reliability of the 
incarceration variables from the NLSY97, which are used to distinguish 
ex- oﬀenders from non-  oﬀenders.
For each labor market outcome, the ﬁ  rst of the paired, odd-  numbered 
columns in table 3.6 shows the eﬀects of incarceration in a repeated cross-
  sectional model. In these speciﬁ  cations, ex-  oﬀenders are 8.8 percentage 
points less likely to be employed than non-  oﬀenders (column [1a]), have 
wages that are only 1.7 percent less than those of non-  oﬀenders (column 
[3a]), and have annual earnings that are 15 percent less than the earnings of 
non- oﬀenders (column [5a]). The diﬀerences in employment probabilities 
and earnings are signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero, while the diﬀerence in 
wages is not. As mentioned before, the result for wages may be attenuated 
by the ongoing relative school enrollment rate of non-  oﬀenders. Since ex- 
oﬀenders and non- oﬀenders may diﬀer systematically in unobservable ways, 
a second set of speciﬁ  cations in table 3.6 exploits the panel structure of the 
data with individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects. In these models, the eﬀect of incarceration 
on employment is smaller in absolute value (–2.9 percentage points) and no 
longer signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero (column [2a]). In the panel setting, 
the wages of ex- oﬀenders are 2.9 percent lower than those of non- oﬀenders, 
but the estimate is still not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero (column [4a]). 
Earnings are still lower for ex-  oﬀenders and the estimate is signiﬁ  cantly 
diﬀerent from zero (column [6a]).
I now turn to the estimates of the eﬀect of the openness of criminal history 
records on the labor market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders. These estimates can 
be found next to their respective models without the open records variables. 
In the repeated cross-  sectional models, the sign on the estimated coeﬃcient 
Access   Inc is negative for employment status and log wages, but positive 
for log earnings—indicating that ex- oﬀenders are less likely to be employed, 
have lower wages, but higher earnings in states with Internet sites providing 
information about ex-  oﬀenders (columns [1b], [3b], and [5b]). But none 
of these parameter estimates is statistically signiﬁ  cant, which suggests it is 
diﬃcult to identify the relative eﬀects of open records using only state and 
time variation in record openness. The speciﬁ  cations in the even columns 
additionally identify the eﬀect of open records using individual changes in 
oﬀender status. Each of these models includes individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects, but 
excludes the state eﬀects and time-  invariant controls. For all three labor 
market outcomes in the panel models, the sign of the estimated coeﬃcient 
on Access   Inc is negative, indicating that ex-  oﬀenders are less likely to be 
employed, have lower wages, and lower earnings in states with Internet sites 
providing information about ex-  oﬀenders. In particular, the employment 
probabilities of ex-  oﬀenders are 5 percentage points lower in open-  records 
states, but the estimate is not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero (column [2b]). 
The wages of ex- oﬀenders are 8.7 percent lower in open- records states, and 
this estimate is signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero (column [4b]). The earnings 112    Keith  Finlay
of ex- oﬀenders are 18.7 percent lower in open- records states (column [6b]). 
This estimate is signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent at the 0.1 level of signiﬁ  cance. What 
is striking about these estimates is that they overshadow the main eﬀect of 
incarceration in those regressions. In the wage regression (column [4b]), the 
main eﬀect of incarceration is indistinguishable from zero and very small 
relative to the marginal eﬀect of open records. This suggests that the avail-
ability of information about criminal histories plays a major role in deter-
mining the labor market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders.
These results show that greater employer access to criminal histories is 
associated with worse labor market outcomes for ex- oﬀenders. This evidence 
demonstrates the presence of imperfect information about criminal histo-
ries by employers. If employers had perfect information about the potential 
criminality of applicants, then greater access to criminal histories would not 
change the employment and wage outcomes of ex- oﬀenders. The combina-
tion of imperfect information about applicant criminality and employer 
aversion to hiring ex- oﬀenders is a strong motivation for employers to statis-
tically discriminate. I now investigate whether such statistical discrimination 
occurs by examining the relative outcomes of non-  oﬀenders from highly 
oﬀending groups.
3.5.2      Expanded Access to Criminal History Data and the Labor 
Market Outcomes of Ex-  Oﬀenders and Non-  Oﬀenders
In order to learn about whether employers statistically discriminate in 
the absence of criminal history data, one would like to compare the labor 
market outcomes of non- oﬀenders from groups with high rates of incarcera-
tion with the labor market outcomes of groups with low rates of incarcera-
tion, and in states that have open records policies versus states that do not. 
In the empirical model that follows, I base that comparison on predicted 
cumulative probabilities of incarceration using variables that any prospec-
tive employer is likely to be able to observe and could use as a basis for 
statistical discrimination.
Suppose there is a vector of individual characteristics, given by Z, whose 
elements are easily observable by potential employers and are known to 
be correlated with criminality or prior incarceration. If employers cannot 
directly observe criminality or prior incarceration, they can use these observ-
able qualities to construct a measure of predicted or perceived criminality. 
One way they could do this would be to create a regression-  weighted index 
of variables in Z, and use this as a proxy for criminality in their hiring deci-
sions. Since the base rates of prior incarceration are so diﬀerent, I run these 
regressions separately for men and women. Since prior incarceration is a 
low-  probability event, I focus on a probit model of the following form:
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where  it is an error component and  [ ] is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the standard normal distribution. After estimating this regression, 
employers can predict a measure of perceived criminality: 
             PC
it  P(Inc
it =1)  = (ˆ  
0 +Z
it ˆ  
1).
The vector of characteristics observable to employers, Z, could include 
many variables, and only some of these are observable in the NLSY97 (or 
any labor market survey, for that matter).19 Given the racial and ethnic dis-
parities in incarceration, I include dummy variables for race and ethnicity. 
There are also substantial education diﬀerences between the incarcerated 
and nonincarcerated populations, so employers might also try to use educa-
tional enrollment or completion as proxies for criminality. I include indica-
tors for school enrollment and highest degree completed and a continuous 
measure for years of completed schooling. Employers may consider evidence 
of prior labor market experience as precluding much prior incarceration, so 
I include the number of years of labor market experience since age thirteen. 
Employers may also use other easily observable demographic or physical 
characteristics as proxies for criminality, such as age, body mass index, and 
central- city residence.20 I include these in the incarceration regressions. Since 
some of the respondents in the sample are still in school, I interact age with 
the schooling variables. Incarceration probabilities vary signiﬁ  cantly for men 
by race, so the control variables in the male equation are interacted with the 
black and Hispanic indicators.
Table 3.7 shows the coeﬃcient estimates for equation (3) from probit 
regressions of the indicator for prior incarceration on the variables discussed 
earlier. I use all panel observations but do not exploit the panel structure, 
since those eﬀects are unobservable to employers. Column (1) shows the 
coeﬃcient estimates for men, broken down by the main eﬀects and the racial 
and ethnic interaction eﬀects. Column (2) shows the coeﬃcient estimates for 
women. Current enrollment is a strong negative predictor of prior incarcera-
tion for both men and women. Black men, Hispanic men, and women who 
have completed high school are signiﬁ  cantly less likely to have an incarcera-
tion record relative to those who do not ﬁ  nish high school. Years of labor 
market experience is a positive predictor of prior incarceration for black men 
and women, but for white and Hispanic men the coeﬃcient estimates are 
not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero. This labor market experience variable 
includes work as a minor, so the estimates for women and black men are 
19. There may be very important characteristics that employers observe during the applica-
tion or interview process, such as dress or speech, that may be correlated with criminality or 
incarceration.
20. The body mass index (BMI) cannot be constructed for all NLSY97 respondents because 
of missing data, so the BMI is demeaned and missing values are assigned a zero (i.e., the sample 
mean). Then a dummy is included that is equal to 1 if the BMI is missing for that observation, 
and zero otherwise.114    Keith  Finlay
consistent with work as a substitute for schooling. Central-  city residence is 
associated with higher cumulative probabilities of incarceration for black 
men, but lower cumulative probabilities for Hispanic men. A higher body 
mass index is associated with a lower cumulative incarceration probability, 
but the eﬀect is less negative for black men. Finally, note that the coeﬃcient 
estimates for the main eﬀects of race and ethnicity in the male equation are 
not informative about the relationship between race and cumulative prob-
abilities of incarceration. For women, the estimates are quite similar to the 
main eﬀects for men. The exception is that there is no comparable diﬀerence 
Table 3.7  Coeﬃcient estimates from probit regressions of prior adult incarceration on 
variables observable by employers, by gender, NLSY97, 1997–2004








interactions   (2) Women
Enrolled –0.435 –0.087 –0.032 –0.438
(0.076) (0.116) (0.142) (0.101)
Highest grade completed –0.300 0.014 0.179 –0.140
(0.027) (0.040) (0.047) (0.026)
At least high school graduate 0.088 –0.160 –0.614 –0.353
(0.093) (0.135) (0.151) (0.104)
At least a BA 0.174 0.083 –0.505 –0.110
(0.198) (0.290) (0.364) (0.220)
Years of labor market experience since age 13 0.015 0.049 0.003 0.040
(0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.016)
Lives in central city of MSA –0.026 0.189 –0.253 0.063
(0.059) (0.081) (0.097) (0.067)
Body mass index –0.028 0.010 0.012 –0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Missing body mass index –0.594 –0.014 –0.001 –0.454
(0.129) (0.026) (0.028) (0.229)
Age 0.188 –0.032 –0.047 0.119





Pseudo R2 0.18 0.14
Observations 18,657 18,457
Proportion ever incarcerated   0.06           0.01
Notes: Probit coeﬃcient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses. Sample consists of 
NLSY97 respondents aged eighteen to twenty-  ﬁ  ve years. See table 3.2 for a complete description of the 
sample restrictions. Neither model exploits the panel structure of the data by including individual ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects, since those eﬀects would be unobservable to employers. Rather, the data are treated as repeated 
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in prior incarceration by race or ethnicity for women. In general, these esti-
mates are consistent with the demographics of the incarcerated population.
Using the estimated parameters from table 3.7, predicted probabilities 
of incarceration are generated for each person-  year observation. The pre-
dicted probabilities for men and women are combined into a single measure 
of perceived criminality. For white men, black men, Hispanic men, and all 
women, ﬁ  gure 3.4 shows the estimated kernel densities of the predicted prob-
ability of incarceration from the probit models.21 Note that the distribution 
contains the cumulative incarceration probabilities for the entire range of 
ages in the sample. Thus, the cumulative incarceration probabilities for the 
oldest male respondents are located in the far right tail of the distributions 
in ﬁ  gure 3.4.
Using the constructed measure of perceived criminality, the eﬀects of 
open records for ex- oﬀenders and non- oﬀenders can be estimated. For each 
labor market outcome Y, I estimate the following regression:
Fig. 3.4    Estimated kernel densities of predicted probability of incarceration, by 
race and ethnicity (for men) and gender, NLSY97 respondents aged eighteen to 
twenty- ﬁ  ve years, 1997–2004
Notes: Densities are smoothed by the Epanechnikov kernel using boundary correction and the 
Silverman rule-  of-  thumb bandwidth. Predictions are from the male and female models in 
table 3.7.
21. The densities are smoothed by the Epanechnikov kernel, using boundary correction and 
the Silverman rule-  of-  thumb bandwidth.116    Keith  Finlay
(4)  Y ist    0    1PCit    2AccessstIncist    3PCitAccessst 
     4PCitAccessstIncist    5PCitIncist    6Accessst 
     7Incist
   Xist 8    s    t   εist,
where PCit is the perceived criminality index predicted from equation (3) 
for individual i in year t, and ε is an error term. Equation (4) embeds the 
relative eﬀects of open records on ex-  oﬀenders and on non-  oﬀenders in a 
single framework and allows these eﬀects to vary by the individual’s pre-
dicted criminality. This equation is an extension of the one used earlier to 
examine the model of statistical discrimination (equation [1])—adding the 
control variables X, state ﬁ  xed eﬀects  s, and time eﬀects  t necessary for 
identiﬁ  cation.22
As before, the eﬀects of employer access to criminal history records can 
be identiﬁ  ed in two ways. In the ﬁ  rst research design, the parameters can 
be identiﬁ  ed from spatial and temporal variation in the introduction of 
open records.23 These speciﬁ  cations treat the data as pooled cross sections 
and use state and year ﬁ  xed eﬀects for identiﬁ  cation.24 The repeated cross-
  sectional design is the one shown in equation (4). In an alternative strat-
egy, the parameters are identiﬁ  ed from the changes in both oﬀender status 
and perceived criminality, in addition to the state and time variation when 
states began to make criminal history records available over the Internet. 
This design exploits the longitudinal structure of the NLSY97 and includes 
individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects and year eﬀects, but excludes the state eﬀects and 
time-  invariant controls. The pooled cross-  sectional speciﬁ  cation is some-
what diﬃcult to interpret without additional assumptions about the eﬀect of 
perceived criminality conditional on the elements of X, which are standard 
covariates included in regressions of labor market outcomes. Even with the 
interaction eﬀects of perceived criminality, the estimates could be identify-
ing changes in the return to education, for example, rather than changes 
in how employers perceive the risk of hiring an applicant with a particular 
expected value of criminal activity. For this reason, the panel regression 
with individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects is the preferred model because it eliminates the 
need to make any identifying assumptions about how the covariates directly 
aﬀect the outcomes. I include the cross-  sectional models because the short 
22. As in the ﬁ  rst set of regressions of labor market outcomes, all continuous covariates in 
these speciﬁ  cations are centered by the sample means from each model’s respective sample. This 
allows meaningful interpretation of the main eﬀect of Access.
23. It is possible to identify the eﬀect of opening records on the labor market outcomes of 
ex- oﬀenders relative to non-  oﬀenders by using only data from states that change their policy 
toward criminal history records. In speciﬁ  cations that use this smaller sample of states, point 
estimates for parameters of interest are similar, but less precisely measured.
24. A pre-  post eﬀect may be confounded by time trends that are speciﬁ  c to adopting states. 
To account for this, linear time trends for Census regions were included in a set of speciﬁ  ca-
tions as a robustness check. The estimated parameters of interest were quite similar with those 
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sample and youth of the respondents limits the variation available to identify 
an individual ﬁ  xed-  eﬀect regression.
Table 3.8 shows the estimates from equation (4) using the two identiﬁ  ca-
tion strategies for each labor market outcome. The odd- numbered columns 
show the estimates using the pooled cross-  sectional identiﬁ  cation strategy 
and the even-  numbered columns show the estimates using the longitudinal 
identiﬁ  cation strategy.
Now, recall the two primary hypotheses of the statistical discrimination 
model. The ﬁ  rst hypothesis is that open records should increase the rela-
tive penalty that ex-  oﬀenders face in the labor market because they can be 
distinguished from non-  oﬀenders. This can be tested with the coeﬃcient 
on the interaction of Access and Inc using the alternative hypothesis  2   
0. The second hypothesis is that open records should improve the relative 
outcomes of non-  oﬀenders who have high levels of perceived criminality. 
Restated, this is equivalent to the hypothesis that open records should harm 
the relative outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders who have high perceived criminality. 
This can be tested with the coeﬃcient on the interaction of PC, Access, and 
Inc, using the alternative hypothesis  4   0.
First, focus on the estimates of  2, which measures how open records 
aﬀect the main eﬀect of actual criminality. In the pooled cross-  sectional 
models in the odd-  numbered columns, the estimates of  2 are positive, 
which is not as expected, but the estimates are very close to zero and statis-
tically insigniﬁ  cant. Since there may be substantial unobservable diﬀerences 
between ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders, the longitudinal models in the 
even-  numbered columns may provide more informative results. In these 
speciﬁ  cations, the estimated coeﬃcients on Access   Inc are all negative, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that ex-  oﬀenders will do relatively 
worse in the labor market once criminal history records are easily accessible 
by employers. The estimate of  2 is only statistically signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent 
from zero, however, in the earnings regression. Although I hesitate to make 
strong statements given the lack of statistical signiﬁ  cance, the signs of these 
eﬀects are consistent with a statistical discrimination story in which employ-
ers continue to hire ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders in similar proportions 
after criminal records become more available, but non- oﬀenders do start to 
receive somewhat higher wages than ex- oﬀenders when employers can verify 
their criminal histories.
The next hypothesis from the statistical discrimination model is that non-
 o ﬀenders from highly oﬀending groups should have improved labor market 
outcomes once employers can verify their clean criminal histories. This is 
the same as saying that ex-  oﬀenders from highly oﬀending groups should 
have relatively worse outcomes from non-  oﬀenders from highly oﬀending 
groups. This is captured by the coeﬃcient on the interaction of perceived 
criminality, open records, and actual criminality,  4. If  4 is less than zero, 
ex- oﬀenders do increasingly worse than non- oﬀenders as a function of their Table 3.8  Regressions of labor market outcomes on criminal records policy variables and 
perceived criminality, NLSY97, 1997–2004
Emp. Emp. LnWage LnWage LnEarn. LnEarn.
Covariates   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
PC (1) 0.342 0.084 0.266 –0.078 1.759 0.735
(0.095) (0.119) (0.067) (0.083) (0.213) (0.298)
Access  Inc (2) 0.013 –0.028 0.036 –0.036 0.090 –0.319
(0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.170) (0.136)
PC  Access (3) –0.169 0.146 –0.246 –0.114 –0.185 0.047
(0.159) (0.143) (0.097) (0.123) (0.352) (0.356)
PC  Access  Inc (4) –0.095 –0.258 –0.282 –0.298 –0.351 1.094
(0.255) (0.324) (0.338) (0.278) (1.170) (1.084)
PC  Inc (5) –0.131 0.148 –0.179 –0.053 –1.591 –1.635
(0.188) (0.267) (0.207) (0.173) (0.381) (0.573)
Access (6) –0.027 –0.030 –0.001 –0.021 –0.046 –0.059
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.043) (0.030)
Inc (7) –0.085 –0.033 0.003 0.011 –0.053 0.069
(0.028) (0.036) (0.024) (0.033) (0.083) (0.114)
Has GED 0.087 0.009 0.054 0.006 0.367 0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.058) (0.058)
Has HS diploma 0.162 0.022 0.070 0.020 0.277 0.067
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.026) (0.039)
Has associate’s 0.230 0.013 0.152 0.074 0.447 0.081
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.080) (0.054)
Has bachelor’s plus 0.210 0.155 0.234 0.214 0.213 0.258
(0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.052) (0.047)
Years attended since 13 0.021 0.045 0.004 0.106 0.100 0.343
(0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017) (0.029) (0.032)
Years exp. since 13 –0.002 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.001 –0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Age 0.102 0.245 0.119 0.130 1.033 1.145
(0.044) (0.032) (0.036) (0.031) (0.133) (0.098)
Age2 –0.002 –0.006 –0.002 –0.003 –0.021 –0.028
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
ASVAB 0.0007 0.0011 –0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Missing ASVAB 0.017 0.049 –0.010
(0.008) (0.013) (0.030)
Black male –0.118 –0.066 –0.359
(0.014) (0.012) (0.038)
Hispanic male 0.032 –0.028 0.028
(0.017) (0.015) (0.033)
Female –0.045 –0.103 –0.287
(0.009) (0.011) (0.024)
Unemployment rate –0.004 –0.004 –0.011 –0.011 –0.021 –0.018
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.015)
Speciﬁ  cation
Year eﬀects x x xxxx
State eﬀects x x x
Individual eﬀects x x x
Observations 36,687 36,687 30,145 30,145 27,137 27,137
R2   0.07   0.04   0.15   0.14   0.25   0.35
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-  robust standard errors that are clustered at the state level are in parentheses. 
Sample consists of NLSY97 respondents aged eighteen to twenty-  ﬁ  ve years. See table 3.2 for a complete 
description of the sample restrictions. Each continuous covariate is centered by its mean from each re-
gression’s respective sample. Employment-  status regressions are linear probability models. Full regres-
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perceived criminality. In the repeated cross- sectional models, the parameter 
estimates of  4 are all negative, which is consistent with improved outcomes 
of non-  oﬀenders from highly oﬀending groups. None of these estimates, 
however, are statistically signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero. In the panel mod-
els, the estimates of  4 are negative for employment status and log wages, 
but positive for log earnings. In general, the estimates for this hypothesis are 
imprecisely measured but broadly consistent with the notion that employers 
statistically discriminate in the absence of criminal history records.
In summary, there is some evidence that expanded employer access to 
criminal history records has increased the diﬀerence in outcomes between 
non- oﬀenders and ex-  oﬀenders, holding perceived criminality constant. 
There is some evidence that the labor market outcomes of non-  oﬀenders 
have improved in states that have made records available over the Internet 
compared with the change in outcomes for non-  oﬀenders in states that did 
not make records available over the Internet. This suggests that the expanded 
outcome gap between non-  oﬀenders and ex-  oﬀenders is primarily driven 
by the worsening outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders once records become available 
over the Internet.
3.5.3    Interpreting  the  Results
Evidence presented previously indicates that the employment eﬀects 
of incarceration are more negative in states that provide criminal history 
records over the Internet than in states that do not. These results for ex- 
oﬀenders are consistent with asymmetric information about criminal histo-
ries in labor markets. If employers had perfect information and could iden-
tify all potential criminals among applicants, then greater access to criminal 
history records would not cause a change in the labor market outcomes of 
ex- oﬀenders.25 And evidence of imperfect information suggests that employ-
ers have a strong motivation to statistically discriminate against individuals 
from highly oﬀending groups. Another important ﬁ  nding for ex- oﬀenders is 
that the estimated eﬀects of open records on the outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders 
are relatively large compared with the main eﬀects of incarceration on labor 
market outcomes. That is, the marginal eﬀect of opening records on the 
labor market outcomes of an individual who has a criminal record is larger 
than the main eﬀect of the incarceration itself. This suggests that the avail-
ability of criminal history data is an important determinant of the labor 
market outcomes of former prisoners.
While this research provides compelling evidence that increased avail-
ability of criminal background data is associated with worse labor market 
25. This evidence is consistent with the audit study results of Pager (2003). She ﬁ  nds that 
auditors who signaled their own incarceration record during the application phase of hiring 
had call back rates that were half as large as the call back rates for the other auditor. The rela-
tive eﬀect of information disclosure was similar for auditors from highly incarcerated groups 
(blacks) and auditors from less incarcerated groups (whites).120    Keith  Finlay
outcomes for ex-  oﬀenders, evidence for its eﬀects on non-  oﬀenders is less 
conclusive. Most of the estimated eﬀects of open records on the outcomes 
of non-  oﬀenders are negative, as expected, but none are statistically sig-
niﬁ  cant. There are a number of explanations for the lack of clear results 
for non-  oﬀenders. First, as in most studies of the diﬀerences between ex- 
oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders, there is a limited number of observations on 
the ex-  oﬀenders. Moreover, few ex-  oﬀender observations occur in the time 
period before most states adopted Internet background checks sites. Table 
3.9 shows the number of panel observations by whether respondents will 
ever be incarcerated and by whether their states of residence provide crimi-
nal history records over the Internet. This weakens the identiﬁ  cation of any 
eﬀects of open records, since the comparisons are primarily cross-  sectional 
rather than longitudinal.
The short sample period available in the current release of the NLSY97 
also makes it diﬃcult to draw conclusions about the long- term consequences 
of wider criminal background checking by employers. There is evidence that 
some ex- oﬀenders have improved labor market outcomes immediately after 
conviction or prison release since they tend to seek work in spot markets 
for labor that have little prospect of training or earnings growth (Nagin 
and Waldfogel 1995; Nagin and Waldfogel 1998). In the short run, non-
 o ﬀenders may also invest more in human capital and have temporarily lower 
employment odds and wages relative to ex-  oﬀenders. A short time frame 
exacerbates this problem, since estimates may give an incomplete picture of 
the labor market outcomes of ex- oﬀenders relative to non- oﬀenders. Future 
research should attempt to use a longer sample to investigate if estimates 
from the model are more consistent with statistical discrimination.
Another concern is that there is no information about the actual percep-
tions that employers have about who is likely to commit crime once hired. 
Table 3.9  Frequency of panel observations, by whether state of residence will ever 
adopt the provision of criminal history records over the Internet, before 
and after policy change, for ex-  oﬀenders and non-  oﬀenders
      Preadoption   Post- adoption  
Adopting states
    Will ever be incarcerated in sample
    Not  yet  incarcerated 77 135
    Already  incarcerated 38 427
    Will never be incarcerated in sample 1,627 11,505
Nonadopting states
    Will ever be incarcerated in sample
    Not  yet  incarcerated 148 279
    Already  incarcerated 35 653
      Will never be incarcerated in sample   2,567   19,196  
Notes: Adopting states are those that have ever adopted Internet sites with information on 
ex- oﬀenders. The synthetic cut-  oﬀ for nonadopting states is 2001, the median year of adop-
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In this chapter, perceived criminality is assumed to come from rational 
expectations based on current incarceration probabilities. That is, I assume 
employers are capable of making unbiased predictions of the likelihood 
that any applicant has a criminal record conditional on characteristics that 
are observable to both the employer and the econometrician. But employ-
ers may have other concerns than who has been incarcerated or they may 
be misinformed about the actual probabilities of criminal activity or incar-
ceration. If employers estimate criminality with substantial error, then they 
are not eﬀectively statistically discriminating, but rather they are simply 
discriminating against the groups for whom employers overproject a risk of 
crime. Economists generally argue that inaccurate forecasts should be driven 
out of the market by competition. But employers who face ex-  oﬀenders 
as applicants may be risk averse in light of negligent-  hiring lawsuits, and 
so have little incentive to improve their forecasts of criminality. This is an 
area where ethnographic work or audit studies may be particularly infor-
mative to establish how employers perceive the potential risk of hiring ex- 
oﬀenders. Further work could examine the sensitivity of these results once 
one accounts for measurement error and imperfect perceptions of incarcera-
tion probabilities.
Finally, the nature of criminal history systems may lead to Type 1 and 
Type 2 error rates that drive eﬀects primarily for ex-  oﬀenders but not non-
 o ﬀenders. One possibility is that criminal background checks have very low 
probabilities of false negatives, but very high probabilities of false positives. 
There is some concern in the government agencies that manage criminal 
history data systems that name-  based searches of records can yield high 
rates of false positives (of a criminal record) and false negatives. The System 
for the Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories (SEARCH 
[1999]) reports that name- based searches made through the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center yielded false posi-
tives at a rate of 7.5 percent. If false negatives are rare and employers have 
imperfect information about records, then greater access to criminal his-
tories should lead to substantial negative eﬀects for ex-  oﬀenders since it 
reveals damaging information previously unavailable. But if the rate of false 
positives is very high, then greater access to criminal histories may not cause 
an improvement in the labor market outcomes of non- oﬀenders from highly 
oﬀending groups, even if employers statistically discriminate. Employers 
may consider not ﬁ  nding a record of little consequence if they are aware 
of the imperfections in the criminal records systems, so they may continue 
to discount the productivity of individuals with high predicted criminality. 
This eﬀect would be exacerbated if there is more similarity of names within 
narrow racial and social classes.26 Therefore, this type of asymmetric preci-
26. The observation that some names are common within racial groups, but not across them, 
is the basis of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2004) correspondence audit study of discrimina-
tion in hiring.122    Keith  Finlay
sion of criminal background checks is consistent with the evidence in this 
chapter but also with statistical discrimination by employers.
Some of the concerns discussed here apply generally to empirical studies 
of statistical discrimination, and their implications should be considered 
when researchers try to interpret the magnitude of estimated eﬀects of sta-
tistical discrimination.
3.6    Conclusion
This chapter examines how expanded employer access to criminal his-
tory data inﬂ  uences the labor market outcomes of ex-  oﬀenders and non-
 o ﬀenders. I ﬁ  nd evidence that employment eﬀects of incarceration are more 
negative in states that provide criminal history records over the Internet than 
in states that do not. There is also evidence that ex-  oﬀenders in states with 
open records policies have lower wages and earnings than ex-  oﬀenders in 
states with more closed records policies. There is less conclusive evidence 
that labor market outcomes of non- oﬀenders from highly oﬀending groups 
are improved by greater employer access to criminal history data. While 
the estimates are consistent with the theoretical prediction, the estimated 
eﬀects for non-  oﬀenders are not estimated precisely enough to draw strong 
conclusions about whether employers statistically discriminate to avoid hir-
ing ex- oﬀenders. One explanation for these results is that the sample period 
is too short to capture the long-  term eﬀects of opening criminal history 
records to the public. Another explanation is that the nature of false- positive 
and false-  negative criminal check results generates signiﬁ  cant eﬀects for 
ex- oﬀenders but not non-  oﬀenders. Nevertheless, the empirical methods 
used in this analysis are a fruitful way for examining the extent of statistical 
discrimination when there are changes in the information set available to 
employers during hiring.
This research is important for understanding why released prisoners 
experience poor labor market outcomes. The labor market outcomes of 
ex- oﬀenders are a public ﬁ  nance concern because failure to gain legitimate 
employment after prison release is a strong predictor of recidivism, which 
is costly for prison systems. Regression estimates indicate that more widely 
available criminal history data worsens the labor market outcomes of ex- 
oﬀenders. In fact, in some speciﬁ  cations, the eﬀect of open records on ex- 
oﬀenders trumps the main eﬀect of being an ex- oﬀender, suggesting that the 
information available to employers has a major impact on how ex- oﬀenders 
reintegrate into the legitimate labor force. This research also highlights how 
the high relative rates of incarceration for black and Hispanic men may 
aﬀect the employment outcomes of non-  oﬀenders from those groups. One 
of the expected beneﬁ  ts of an open-  records system is that informational 
symmetry should help non-  oﬀenders from highly oﬀending groups. I do 
not ﬁ  nd statistically signiﬁ  cant evidence of this eﬀect, but further research Employer Access to Criminal History Data and Labor Market Outcomes    1 2 3
should continue to address this potential side eﬀect of providing criminal 
history records over the Internet.
A criminal background check is, however, just one type of preemployment 
screen that has become more convenient for employers to carry out because 
of technological changes. Our personal information is increasingly available 
over the Internet and some of this information can be used in the hiring 
process. For example, personal credit reports are used by some employers 
to gauge the ﬁ  nancial responsibility of applicants (Arnoldy 2007). Some 
human resource managers also search peer-  to-  peer websites like MySpace 
for revealing information about potential employees, especially recent col-
lege graduates with little labor market history (Finder 2006). The productiv-
ity basis for some screens may be obvious, such as driving record checks for 
commercial truck drivers, but for other screens the connection to produc-
tivity may be less clear. The research design in this chapter could serve as a 
useful strategy for measuring the eﬀects of these types of technologies that 
expand the information sets available to employers during hiring.
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